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# Introduction

**Abstract.** The introduction outlines the main ideas behind this book, its genesis, and the relationship with extant scholarship. Before presenting a tour through the book, it discusses the different viewpoints on Russia and its relation to Europe or "the West" as articulated in "the West" and in Russia herself as a background for studying the Chinese views on the topic. Since the latter were also intertwined with Japan to some degree, the role and impact of Japanese perceptions of Russia and "the West" are also briefly recalled. Similarly, the concept of "the West" itself is not a set and fixed given, but needs to be problematized. The book's main aim consists of looking closer into the changes, continuities, and contingencies of Chinese perceptions of Russia and the West during the 20th century, focusing on three areas: official normative views as reflected in Chinese school history textbooks; creative imaginary approaches in literature; and visual and material manifestations in everyday life. Acknowledging "Greater China" as representing "Chinese" perceptions, beyond mainland China also Taiwan, and to some degree Hong Kong and Macau, are addressed. Taking the 20th century with its many historical shifts and reconfigurations of entities in political, social, and economic terms as the longitudinal line, the book presents a multilayered discussion of "Chinese" perceptions of what "Russia" and "the West" meant for whom, when, and why; where "frontlines" between them were acknowledged; and under which circumstances, by whom, and to which end, the entities as such were constructed, questioned, reconfigured, merged, or even dissolved.

**Keywords.** Russia, the West, Europe, Greater China, Japan.

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This book aims at investigating changes and continuities in Chinese perceptions of Russia and the West during the 20th century, paying heed to the fact that the respective ascriptions and "frontlines" were historically contingent: who and what represented "Russia" or "the West" at a given time and at a given place? Was "Russia" seen as part of "the West", or not? And if it was, in which regard? Which factors, foreign or indigenous, led to changes in Chinese perceptions and representations and why? Such questions have been in mind when this book was taking shape, growing out of a German-Russian project funded by the DFG and the RFBR, the respective national research foundations.

The German-Russian research team from Heidelberg University and St. Petersburg State University worked on exploring the topic, concentrating on three major areas. The first area is the field of socialization in schools via a look into normative descriptions of Russia and the West in Chinese textbooks which define official images of the "other/s" from childhood on in an authoritative setting. Without going here into the large field of academic studies from various disciplinary perspectives about "self" and "other" (or "Other" in the Lacanian sense of radical alterity), suffice it to say that school history teaching is mostly concerned with the nationalized "self" (for which the "non-self", either framed as "the foreign" or as "the world", is needed in terms of counter distinction). In practice, when actively teaching on the subject of "others", these are dealt with in a primarily nationalized way, too, and thus "the West" is often broken down into national cases. Still, the legacy of the broader concept of "Western history" (*xiyangshi* 西洋史) applied in China with the attempts at designing a national school system in the early 20th century, did not disappear. This concept assumed some commonness between several national cases, usually intending some (Western) European countries and North America or, as some scholars term it, "Greater Europe" which were deemed particularly relevant for China. In summary, the look into school history curricula and textbooks over time and space provides the official view the respective Chinese regime wanted to inculcate into its young citizens, and it is in this context that the normative view on "Russia" and "the West" is investigated here.

The second area is the field of literature and Chinese fictional representations of Russia and the West consumed by a Chinese reading public, which created, reinforced, or challenged an *imaginaire* of what "Russia" / "the West" embodied. While the history textbooks concentrate on (chosen) facts, mostly connected to national politics, albeit presenting them at times in an emotionalized language to imbue the "facts" with value judgements, but still basically aiming at "knowledge content", literature rather focuses on the cultural and personal, being also interested in the *mentalité* in all its complexities. While school education with its exams is (in tendency at least and increasingly over the century) mandatory, the reading

of Russian / Western literary works in translation, or of Chinese creative works presenting their own images of foreigners, is usually situated in a leisure setting and also optional. While Chinese translations "cut a window through to Europe" (to take up the famous phrase of PUSHKIN (1799–1837) on Peter the Great's bronze horseman statue in St. Petersburg) and, mutatis mutandis, on Russia, Chinese authors well read in foreign literature at times also mirror the Chinese "self" by using Russian / Western "others" creatively as a device for Chinese introspection. In other words, the "self" and "other/s" intersect in the *imaginaire* in multiple ways in the field of literature.

The third and final area is the field of visual and material manifestations which define images of "others" in their own medial way and make them accessible also to a public far from purely discursive levels. While school education is something willed from above, and the consumption of literature usually a personal decision, visual and material manifestations, for example posters or architecture, also confront those who do not necessarily look for them actively, with representations of "the other/s" by simply being a publicly visible part in daily life. This level, thus, also leads to the broader field of societal practice. In the above threefold way, we move through the topic from discourse and imagination to the visual and tangible.

The chosen timeframe of the whole 20th century bridges important developments, i.e. from Tsarist Russia to the Soviet Union to post-Soviet Russia; the Chinese transition from imperial China to the Republic and finally the People's Republic (PRC) vis-à-vis the Chinese Republic on Taiwan (ROC); the two World Wars, the Cold War, its division of Europe and how this impacted upon the image of "the West"; the Sino-Soviet split, the end of the Cold War, and the new constellation in the world after 1989 with its effects on mainland China/Taiwan/Hong Kong/Macau. The focus on "Chinese" perceptions, in turn, intends not only mainland China in the 20th century but also (post-1945) Taiwan, Hong Kong, and Macau, i.e. what has often been termed "Greater China". These two choices in terms of spatial and temporal coverage were intended to lead to a fruitful and multifaceted research on how "Chinese" perceptions of "Russia" and "the West" (and what the latter precisely meant at which given time, where and for whom, and in how far Russia was conceived of as part of the latter or precisely not) shifted, and where possible continuities might be detected. To do this, a variety of media and societal target groups were to be considered. To enrich the "outsider" perspective of the German-Russian research team of Heidelberg University and St. Petersburg State University to which a further German scholar also contributed, Chinese colleagues from the PRC and Taiwan were integrated at a later stage as well, joining in the main conference in Heidelberg. This book, edited by the German side, is the outcome of the collective effort.

In the views of "the West", but also in Russian self-perception, Russia has always been an ambivalent entity: either seen as "a part of Europe", or rather as different, i.e. "apart from Europe".[1] The issue is a longstanding debate. For example, viewing Russia from the outside, the famous German philosopher Gottfried Wilhelm LEIBNIZ (1646–1716) who met Peter the Great (1672–1725) several times in the early 18th century, expressed his hope for Russia, a positively understood "tabula rasa", to serve as a "bridge" between Europe and China.[2] Some decades later the German scholar Johann Gottfried HERDER (1744–1803) claimed her to be geographically mainly in Asia, but with her "heart" still in Europe.[3] But even for those who unequivocally agreed to Russia's being "European", her "location" in the mental mapping of Europe remained to be ascertained. While she was seen by those posing as representatives of "Europe's heart" in discourse as a part of "Northern Europe" at first, she was slowly shifted to "Eastern Europe" during the first half of the 19th century. This configuration became problematic again in the late 20th century after the end of the Cold War when other parts of "Eastern Europe" tried to emancipate themselves from Russia (and, for example, repositioned themselves as Central or Middle Eastern European etc.).[4]

But even if Russia was acknowledged as a part of "Europe", this did not necessarily imply her being acknowledged as a part of "the West",[5] an entity in itself of a considerable malleability, historically, and ideologically.[6] As one scholar put

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1 Cf. international relation scholar Vladimir BARANOVSKY's apt article title: "Russia: a part of Europe, or apart from Europe?". In: *International Affairs* vol. 76, no. 3 (July 2000), pp. 443–458.

2 See Dieter GROH: *Rußland im Blick Europas: 300 Jahre historische Perspektiven* (Russia in Europe's view: 300 years of historical perspectives), Frankfurt/M.: Suhrkamp 1988, pp. 41–53.

3 Johann Gottfried HERDER: *Andrastea* vol. 3, Leipzig: Johann Friedrich Hartknoch 1802, p. 76.

4 For a succinct outline of the issue, see Manfred HILDERMEIER: "Osteuropa als Gegenstand vergleichender Geschichte" (Eastern Europe as a subject of comparative history). In: Gunilla BUDDE, Sebastian CONRAD, Oliver JANZ (eds.): *Transnationale Geschichte: Themen, Tendenzen und Theorien* (Transnational history: themes, tendencies and theories), Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht 2006, pp. 117–136.

5 See Olga MALINOVA: "Russia and 'the West' in the 2000s: Redefining Russian Identity in Official Political Discourse". In: Ray TARAS (ed.): *Russia's Identity in International Relations: Images, Perceptions, Misperceptions*, London and New York: Routledge 2013, pp. 73–90, there p. 74.

6 For a historical discussion, see Heinrich August WINKLER: *Geschichte des Westens: Von den Anfängen in der Antike bis zum 20. Jahrhundert* (History of the West: From the Beginnings in Antiquity through the 20th Century), Munich: C.H. Beck 2016 (1st ed. 2009). For an approach concentrating on the "ideological" side: Alastair BONNETT: *The Idea of the West: Culture, Politics and History*, Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan 2004. For a political

it, "Europe" was less than "the West" and also more than it.[7] Even parts of Europe, which during Cold War times were clearly in the "Western" camp, had not seen themselves to be part of it earlier, notably (West) Germany whose "march to the West" was seen by some as her greatest achievement after WWII and the "Western-critical" Nazi era,[8] although Germany's self-distancing from "the West", perceived as mainly France and Britain and later also the U.S., was much older than the Nazis. "The West" as an ideological concept expanded enormously over time,[9] taking in large parts of the globe, but being constantly reconfigured by the various "uses" it was put to,[10] not only by those supposedly being part of "the West", but decidedly also by those seeing themselves as not being part of it.[11] Regarding Russia's belonging to "the West" or not, the ambivalence of non-Russians came in various forms: in a widespread "Western" perspective, the "Tartar beneath the surface" was "othering" Russians,[12] referring to the Mongol invasion, while intermarrying courts in Europe suggested a commonness and familiarity, if only for the noble elites. Catherine the Great (1729–1796), for one, herself German by birth, defined Russia explicitly as a "European power", but considered it necessary nevertheless to convert from (Western) Protestantism to Eastern Orthodoxy for her own "Russification" to narrow the gap with the people she now governed.

In fact, Eastern Orthodoxy marked large parts of Eastern Europe off the "Latin" ones in the West in Christian contexts, namely after the ecclesiastic Great Schism of 1054 and even more so after the sack of Constantinople in 1204 by the "Latins" during the Fourth Crusade. Finally, the Ottoman conquest of Constantinople in 1453 led to the rise of Moscow in the orthodox world as the self-declared "Third Rome". This famous claim formulated by Philotheus of Pskov (1465–1542) in 1510 referred back to the marriage of the Muscovite ruler Ivan III (1440–1505) with the niece of the last Byzantine emperor in 1472. It should be noted that the Russian

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studies perspective, see Gunther HELLMANN and Benjamin HERBORTH (eds.): *Uses of the West: Security and the Politics of Order*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 2017.

7 See Austrian historian Gerald STOURZH, cited in WINKLER: *Geschichte des Westens* (2016), p. 19.

8 This has been voiced, among others, by Jürgen HABERMAS. However, also before the Nazi era, Germany located "the West" beyond her borders. Cf. again WINKLER: *Geschichte des Westens* (2016), pp. 17–18.

9 See the "seven versions of the West" by LEWIS and WIGEN, reproduced in BONNETT: *The Idea of the West* (2004), pp. 9–10.

10 Cf. HELLMANN/HERBORTH: *Uses of the West* (2017), p. 4.

11 This point has been made very strongly by BONNETT: *The Idea of the West* (2004) with reference to "the West" in Soviet or different varieties of Asian eyes, both critical and favorable.

12 The saying: "grattez le Russe et vous trouverez le Tartare" (scratch the Russian and you will find the Tartar) is usually attributed to Napoleon and became proverbial also in English.

self-identification at that time was rather framed in religious terms, i.e. as Christians, while “nationality” and “Russianness” became an issue only much later. In this regard, Russia remained clearly connected to “the West” via the common Christian faith, especially pronounced as long as the “common threat” of Islam was the key concern.[13] In other words, the issue at stake determined the configuration of entities.

Seen from Russia herself, she had a long history of arguing about her self-perception as part of “the West” or as decidedly different from it as well, searching for “the Russian soul”, the Slavic heritage etc., or going for “Westernization” in the style of Peter the Great, culminating in the Slavophiles vs. Westernizers debates of the 19th century.[14] Some even saw Russia as a “third space”,[15] being “Eurasian” in essence, no matter how that was defined in turn.[16] And the fact that the Tsarist empire as well as the later Soviet Union covered not only ethnic Russians, but many ethnicities, throws into profile the additional problem of the category “Russian”, in fact better reflected in Russian than in Western languages by the differentiation between the ethnic-linguistic *russkiĭ* and the civic *rossiĭskiĭ*. For example, the Ukraine or Belarus as “Little Russia” were a long-term part first of the Tsarist empire, and then of the Soviet Union, not to mention the problem of the Poles or the Baltic region. In addition, the Muslim central Asian and the Caucasian ethnicities differed in language, religion, and custom as much as those ethnicities living in Siberia and the Russian Far East. From the various ethnicities’ perspective all over the Tsarist empire and later the Soviet Union, identity issues had always presented themselves quite differently than in the St. Petersburg / Moscow-based “Russian” dominant view, and became ever more critical with the end of the Soviet Union.

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13 For some of the “Western” perceptions of Russia, see Martin MALIA: *Russia Under Western Eyes: From the Bronze Horseman to the Lenin Mausoleum*, Cambridge/Mass.: Belknap 1999. See also Mark B. SMITH: *The Russia Anxiety: And How History Can Resolve It*, New York: Oxford University Press 2019, esp. chapter 6.

14 For a more general overview of identity constructions in Russia, see Nicholas V. RIASANOVSKY: *Russian Identities: A Historical Survey*, New York and Oxford: Oxford University Press 2005. On various cultural aspects, see Simon FRANKLIN and Emma WIDDIS (eds.): *National Identity in Russian Culture: An Introduction*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 2004. The latter also point to the additional fact that much of “Russian discourses of identity have been formed in an implied dialogue with outsiders” (FRANKLIN/WILLIS p. 5), thus reconnecting Russian discourse with the one about Russia from “the West”.

15 Cf. the notion of “third space” of Homi BHABHA in his *The Location of Culture*, London et al.: Routledge 2004.

16 This idea, proposed with some vigor in the early 1920s, became again fashionable after the end of the Soviet Union. Cf. RIASANOVSKY: *Russian Identities* (2005), pp. 234–235.

While in "Western" somewhat condescending, and at the same time fearful, views, Russia was often seen as backward but in tendency aggressive (the "barbarian at the door"), in a widespread Russian self-perception, Russia was not inherently aggressive, but always only reacting to the treatment she received from "the West": cooperating when accepted and honored as part of the club, though with her distinct features; or staying aloof if not, only becoming more assertive when being (or perceiving herself to be) in a position of strength.[17] Here, the socio-psychological concept of the "significant other" impacting in decisive ways on a subject comes in. While "the West" was certainly not just some "other", but a "significant other" to Russia, this also worked vice versa,[18] namely since the 19th century when Russia played an increasingly important role in international politics, and even more so in the 20th century,[19] culminating in the systemic confrontation with the "capitalist West" by the creation of the first socialist-communist state in history, i.e. Soviet Russia. When the Soviet Union was falling apart, at first Russia and the West seemed to reintegrate, and "Europe" was reconfigured due to the end of the Cold War.[20] But soon this was followed again by a move toward renewed distinction and potential rivalry.

To China, both Russia and the West were "significant others" at various times, namely in the modern era, but before turning to China herself, one factor that cannot be left out of the picture is Japan. Although the rest of the pages will focus on *Chinese* perceptions of Russia and the West, Japan is often the elephant in the room, as since the late 19th century discourses and practices in China were largely influenced by the "Japan factor", albeit in various ways.

Japan herself had a complicated relationship with both Russia and "the West" as her own "significant others". Since Meiji times (1868–1912), Japan tried to associate with the "advanced West", using Tsarist Russia as a negative contrast, not the least out of rivalry, given the geographical vicinity and intersecting interests on the Asian continent. In Japan, this led to a perception and representation of

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17 Cf. the "three patterns of Russia's relation with the West" as proposed by Andrei P. TSYGANKOV: *Russia and the West from Alexander to Putin: Honor in International Relations*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 2012, chapter 1.

18 Cf. Iver B. NEUMANN: *Uses of the Other: "The East" in European Identity Formation*, Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press 1999, especially chapter 3 which is concerned with Russia as Europe's "other", though it was not the only "other" of Europe in history. Notably, NEUMANN does not consider East Asia here, but focuses on the Turkish-Ottoman and the Russian roles in "making Europe".

19 For some foreign relations perspectives with a special focus on mutual perceptions, see the already referred-to edited volume by TARAS: *Russia's Identity in International Relations* (2013).

20 Cf. GORBACHEV's idea of a "common European home" already in the late 1980s, and the 1990s' endeavors under YELTSIN (ELʹT͡SIN) to switch to "Western" economic methods.

Russia as the "barbaric Orient of the West",[21] although this rhetoric was in itself basically derived from "Western" models, primarily Anglo-Saxon and secondarily German ones, and driven by Japan's ambition to join the "Western club" herself. With the regime change to the Soviet Union, Russia could no longer be conceptualized as "backward". But given the challenge and perceived threat posed by the Soviet Union and its new socioeconomic system, in Japan the negative evaluation simply shifted to a new form of Russian "otherness", while after WWII and during the Cold War Japan squarely (re)settled in the "Western" camp herself.[22] These developments had an at least intermediary reflection also in China, be it during the late 19th and early 20th century when many Japanese sources were used as information and reference by Chinese intellectuals, sometimes re-evaluating them according to their own interest, and sometimes also seeing Japan as a model in the sense of a "first step" for an Asian country toward "the West"; be it in Republican times (1912–1949); be it in Manchuria where the Japanese were the real masters behind the Manchukuo regime (1932–1945); or be it in Taiwan when the latter was a Japanese colony (1895–1945).

Although foreign policy or economic rivalry, security concerns, and geopolitical considerations certainly are decisive factors for the relations between countries, the cultural area, including mutual perceptions and representations, are no less patent and influential. Again taking Japan as an example, mutual images in Japan and Russia have proven a fertile ground in scholarship to explore bilateral relations in a broader perspective,[23] though "Russia" was taken here as a singular entity not further problematized via its relation to "the West".

Now turning to the Chinese side, perceptions of Russia's ambivalent position in Europe (part or not part) and in relation to "the West" oscillated over time as well.[24] While, for example, early world-historical representations in China's school textbooks saw Russia primarily as a, somewhat special, part of "the West", and the Christian element as discussed, for example, in literature marked Russia as an (if again somewhat special) part of "Europe" and "the West", too, in the

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21 See Ilya KHARIN: *After Nicholas: Self-Realization of the Japanese Orthodox Church, 1912–1956,* Gloucester: White Margin 2014, p. xiv.

22 For more on the role of Russia as Japan's "other", see Alexander BUKH: *Japan's National Identity and Foreign Policy: Russia as Japan's "Other"*, London and New York: Routledge 2010.

23 Yulia MIKHAILOVA and M. William STEELE (eds.): *Japan and Russia: Three Centuries of Mutual Images*, Folkestone: Global Oriental 2008.

24 It might be briefly noted that in Chinese this understanding of "Europe" vs. "the West" in relation to Russia differed somewhat from the one in Russia herself as can be seen, for example, by the fact that the Russian "Westernizers" (*zapadniki*) of the 19th century are translated into Chinese in various ways, i.e. similarly as "Westernizers" (*xifang pai* 西方派), but also as "West-European-izers" (*xi-Ou pai* 西欧派).

sociopolitical area the “otherness” of Russia was usually highlighted. This could be defined via “Tsarist autocracy” or via the Soviet (no less authoritarian) system, while “the West” was understood in terms of the Anglo-Saxon “democracy model” (which, needless to say, was not historically representative of all of Europe over the 20th century).[25] In terms of economy, in turn, the notion of “the West” was connected to the concepts of free market and capitalism, which Russia / the Soviet Union did not subscribe to. This way of understanding was reflected accordingly in visual and material representations. For the conceptualization of “Russia” this made for a split image emerging during the 20th century. In tendency, while Tsarist Russia and later the “Whites” who often ended up in China after having lost the Civil War in Russia (1917–1922) were rather seen and represented as somehow “European”, the Soviet Union and the “Reds” were perceived as clearly distinct and opposed to “the West”. In consequence, also two “types” of Russians emerged. In terms of power politics, though, even the Soviet Union could appear in China as part of the Great Powers associated with “the West” (which at times also included Japan, as it does today, clearly far from any geographical meaning of the word). Thus, the “frontline” in between very much depended on the criterion chosen or the issue focused upon.

In terms of a diplomatic historical perspective, one often speaks of the “special” Russian-Chinese relations,[26] and in Chinese (and Russian) views of the “Western” colonial empires and supremacy aspirations, Russia seemed to stand out positively, at least for the earlier times when treaties were still concluded without “Western” “gunboat diplomacy”. This figure of argument has gained some currency again in recent years in the context of improving Sino-Russian relations, although this view was never uncontroversial, even in China. As a result of the systemic change in Russia to the Soviet Union on the one hand, and the Chinese Communist revolution on the other subsequently, the “gap” between Russia and “the West” in Chinese perception was deepened significantly due to systemic competition (and “Europe” as a category became even more problematic due to the Cold War, dividing “Europe” roughly into two camps). On the other hand, the increasingly confrontational relationship of the PRC with the former “socialist brother” since the late 1950s and early 1960s, and the PRC’s “foreign policy turnaround” in the early 1970s with a new rapprochement with the U.S. and its allies, along with growing integration into international organizations, quite naturally also had an

25 One may, once again, recall the most outstanding case to the contrary of Nazi Germany, but also the many other dictatorial-authoritarian regimes extant in various European countries at different times during the 20th century.

26 Critical to this: Sarah C.M. Paine: *Imperial Rivals: China, Russia, and Their Disputed Frontier (1858–1924)*, Armonk: Sharpe 1996.

effect on the Chinese perceptions, usually in opposite ways on both sides of the Taiwan Strait, of Russia / the Soviet Union, and "the West". After the end of the Soviet Union, in spite of several argumentative shifts in the PRC where this event and the changes throughout Eastern Europe were watched with great concern, the idea of a far-reaching difference between Russia and "the West" remained, albeit now in a slightly different form and with a reconfigured "Europe".

So far, research interest in Western and Russian scholarship has either concentrated on the China-Russia[27] or the China-"West" (mostly intending individual countries, mainly the U.S. and UK)[28] relationship (which may also be due to the respective language competences required). This specialization on the study of either China-Russia or China-West calls for the still lacking combination of the two perspectives, and the question of changing "frontlines" breaks up those presumed fixed entities. In a sense, the contrary direction of inquiry has been taken by TREADGOLD once by looking into the reception of Western ideas in Russia and China comparatively, though here "the West" has been seen as one given entity moving through time, just "influencing" Russia and China in various "waves" in different intellectual forms.[29] The basic point of departure in this case seems to have been that both countries, Russia and China, had ended up, at the time TREADGOLD was writing, as the main (rivalling) representatives of the Communist "camp" during the Cold War, i.e. with an ideology which had its Marxist basis

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27 On Russia-China in general, see e.g. Aleksandr LUKIN (ed.): *Rossii͡a i Kitaĭ: chetyre veka vzaimodeĭstvii͡a: Istorii͡a, sovremennoe sostoi͡anie i perspektivy razvitii͡a rossiĭsko-kitaĭskikh otnosheniĭ* (Russia and China: 400 years of exchange: history, the present day, and the perspectives of development of Russian-Chinese relations), Moskva: Ves' Mir 2013; for the phase 1858–1924: PAINE: *Imperial Rivals* (1996); on the Soviet Union-China: as a documentary basis, see Heng-yü KUO and M. TITARENKO: *RKP(B), Komintern und die national-revolutionäre Bewegung in China: Dokumente, vol. 1* (The Comintern and the national-revolutionary movement in China: documents), Paderborn: Schöningh 1996; and Mechthild LEUTNER and M. TITARENKO: *KPdSU, Komintern und die national-revolutionäre Bewegung in China: Dokumente, vol. 2* (The Comintern and the national-revolutionary movement in China: documents), Paderborn: Schöningh 1998; for the early Cold War phase: Austin JERSILD: *The Sino-Soviet Alliance: An International History*, Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press 2014; and subsequently Lorenz M. LÜTHI: *The Sino-Soviet Split: Cold War in the Communist World*, Princeton and Oxford: Princeton University Press 2008.

28 In this rather vast literature, see on China-U.S., e.g., Dong WANG: *The United States and China: A History From the Eighteenth Century to the Present*, Lanham: Rowman&Littlefield 2013. On China and Britain, see, e.g., Robert BICKERS and Jonathan J. HOWLETT (eds.): *Britain and China, 1840–1970: Empire, Finance, and War*, New York: Routledge 2016.

29 Donald W. TREADGOLD: *The West in Russia and China: Religious and Secular Thought in Modern Times. Vol. I: Russia, 1472–1917; vol. II: China, 1582–1949*, Cambridge: At the University Press 1973. The spectrum covers Christianity to Marxism in content.

originally in the West. This merited the question as to how this came about, and it foregrounded the logic that these two countries and cultures could and should be compared. In the present volume, though, the somewhat static view on set entities (if as such internally changing over time by intellectual "fashions", as TREADGOLD acknowledged in his approach) influencing other set entities is not the guiding principle, but rather the eye of the beholder is understood as the site where commonness and difference is perceived, creating entities. Thus, the question as to how something constructed as "the West" or as "Russia" / the Soviet Union was perceived, and where in Chinese eyes frontlines were or were not set between them and under which temporal, local, and further circumstances, are at stake.

Some of the individual aspects have most definitely been examined previously. Still, in addition to themes like diplomacy,[30] ideology transfer,[31] or translation questions,[32] a focus on the images and perceptions as reflected in different Chinese media and societal groups during the course of this turbulent century aims at exploring new ways of ascertaining changes and continuities in those perceptions, and the shifting of boundaries in the respective attribution.

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30 For the early post-WWII down-turn of PRC-U.S. relations, see Simei QING: *From Allies to Enemies: Visions of Modernity, Identity, and U.S.-China Diplomacy, 1945–1960*, Cambridge/Mass.: Harvard University Press 2007. On China's shifting alliances in the Cold War, see beyond the works cited above for Russia/Soviet Union-China: Zhihua SHEN and Danhui LI: *After leaning to one side: China and its Allies in the Cold War*, Washington: Woodrow Wilson Center 2011.

31 See, e.g., several contributions in Thomas P. BERNSTEIN and Huayu LI (eds.): *China Learns From the Soviet Union, 1949–Present*, Lanham et al.: Lexington Books 2010, for Soviet Union-China.

32 On the field of literature between Russia and China, see, e.g., Leonid CHERKASSKIĬ: *Russkai͡a literatura na Vostoke: Teorii͡a i praktika perevoda* (Russian Literature in the Orient: Theory and practice of translation), Moskva: Nauka 1987; Mark GAMSA: *The Chinese Translation of Russian Literature*, Leiden: Brill 2008; and Mark GAMSA: *The Reading of Russian Literature in China: A Moral Example and a Manual for Practice*, London: Palgrave MacMillan 2010. On Chinese translations of Western literature and their interrelatedness with Chinese creative writing, see Shouhua QI: *Western Literature in China and the Translation of a Nation*, New York: Palgrave Macmillan 2012. More general on global translation processes with a focus on China: Lydia LIU: *Translingual Practice: Literature, National Culture, and Translated Modernity, China 1900 – 1937,* Stanford: Stanford U.P. 1995. On the translation of Marxist terminology: Wolfgang LIPPERT: *Entstehung und Funktion einiger chinesischer marxistischer Termini: der lexikalisch-begriffliche Aspekt der Rezeption des Marxismus in Japan und China* (Formation and function of some Chinese Marxist terms: the lexical-terminological aspect of the reception of Marxism in Japan and China), Wiesbaden: Steiner 1979. On the Chinese reception of Western scientific terminology: Michael LACKNER et al. (eds.): *New Terms for New Ideas: Western Knowledge and Lexical Change in Late Imperial China,* Leiden: Brill 2001.

While not only Western, but also Russian, views on China have been studied more thoroughly, Chinese views on Russia have only recently received more attention,[33] whereas the Chinese modern image of "the West" or "Westerners" as such remains rather understudied,[34] since this is usually broken down to country-specific detailed studies easier to grasp and less ambiguous.[35] Therefore, a study of the facets and variations of the Chinese image of Russia and "the West" (which for all the country-based specificities is still a commonly "used" concept, frequently referred to in ideological terms as well as in societal practice) in different contexts during the 20th century, pursued in international cooperation, should be a welcome addition to existing scholarship.

The concept of "perception" is deliberately chosen here, since it conceptually, albeit not necessarily temporally in some cases, precedes the formation of a fixed and coherent "image". In a most immediate sense, bodily perception via the senses is represented in the brain to form an image. In a more general sense, as used here, the concept of "perception" also allows for the consideration of historically powerful elements that have not condensed into a single "image" of "the

33 Nikolaĭ SAMOĬLOV: *Rossii͡a i Kitaĭ v XVII – nachale XX veka: tendent͡sii, formy i stadii sot͡siokul'turnogo vzaimodeĭstvii͡a* (Russia and China from the 17th through the early 20th century: tendencies, forms and phases of sociocultural interaction), Sankt-Peterburg: Izdatel′skiĭ dom Sankt-Peterburgskogo gosudarstvennogo universiteta 2014; LI Suian 李随安: *1949–2009 Zhongguo de Eluosi xingxiang 1949–2009* 中国的俄罗斯形象 1949–2009 (China's image of Russia, 1949–2009), Harbin: Heilongjiang jiaoyu chubanshe 2012; see also S. L. TIKHVINSKIĬ: *Vosprii͡atie v Kitae obraza Rossii* (The perception of the image of Russia in China), Moskva: Nauka 2008, for an overview.

34 E.g., see part 1 in Hua MENG and Sukehiro HIRAKAWA (eds.): *Images of Westerners in Chinese and Japanese literature*, Amsterdam: Rodopi 2000; as well as Chinese "Occidentalism": Xiaomei CHEN: *Occidentalism: a Theory of Counter-Discourse in Post-Mao China*, New York: Oxford U.P. 1995; and, as a genealogy in a historical long-term perspective based on the shifting category "West" in the general sense of "west of China": Mingming WANG: *The West as the Other: a Genealogy of Chinese Occidentalism,* Hong Kong: The Chinese University Press 2014.

35 For a bibliographical account of the Chinese image of Germany, see, e.g., Wolfgang BAUER et al.: *Das chinesische Deutschlandbild der Gegenwart: eine Bibliographie* (The contemporary Chinese image of Germany: a bibliography), Stuttgart: Steiner 1989–1992. For a recent publication on France, see the printed roundtable by Nicolas ROUSSEAUX et al.: *Images croisées France-Chine* (Crossed images France-China), Paris: Fondation Victor Segalen 2014; for the more political image of America, e.g. Carola MCGIFFERT (ed.): *Chinese Images of the United States*, Washington: CSIS Press 2005; Hong ZHANG: *America Perceived: The Making of Chinese Images of the United States, 1945–1953,* Westport: Greenwood Press 2002; David SHAMBAUGH: *Beautiful Imperialist: China Perceives America, 1972–1990,* Princeton: Princeton University Press 1991; or more culturally – via translated excerpts – David ARKUSH and Leo Ou-fan LEE (transl. and ed.): *Land without Ghosts: Chinese Impressions of America from the Mid-Nineteenth Century to the Present,* Berkeley: University of California Press 1989.

Westerner" or "the Russian".[36] Rather, it is precisely through the consideration of the changing "frontlines" and historically contingent attributions that the numerous fractures in the constructions of the "other", which are always subject to genre and group-specific negotiation processes, should become visible. The notion of "representation", in turn, is used here when the focus is on the presentational side (which does not necessarily reproduce a social "image" only, but rather often attempts to form, or influence, social "images" in a targeted manner in the first place.) In this sense, conceptually, there is a need to distinguish between perception, image, and representation.

## Tour through the book

In the first part of the book, the normative views on Russia and the West, as defined by the Chinese state via curricula and spelled out in textbooks for transmission in school, are addressed. Starting with the late imperial and Republican times (DMITRENKO), it becomes evident that Russia and the West are treated somewhat differently between discussions embedded in the subject of "Chinese" or "national" history on the one hand, and in the context of "foreign" / "world" history (which, in fact, often made use of foreign textbooks for content, by this adding a further layer to the interpretation) on the other hand. In classes on "Chinese history" which focus on the relation of the "others" to China, a more critical view of the "others" prevails, while the positive achievements of these "others" are, rather, discussed in the context of "world history". A further distinction results from the period under review in a textbook chapter; while earlier historical periods are usually less emotionally charged, the 19th and early 20th century closer to the writing time and connected to the traumatic loss of international standing of the Chinese "self" are more sensitive to frame in an official narrative. While Tsarist Russia since Peter the Great is mostly depicted as "associated" (though "not equal") with "the West" in the sense of great power politics, in fact as the "worst" of aggressors and outstanding troublemaker, the subsequent Soviet Union comes up as a topic in school history only in the 1930s and is treated rather carefully. In the end, Russia is China's direct neighbor. "The West", though, remains ambivalent in evaluation,

36 Such full-fledged national images and stereotypes as reflected in literature and their coming into being have been discussed, e.g., by Manfred BELLER and Joep LEERSSEN (eds.): *Imagology: the Cultural Construction and Literary Representation of National Characters; a Critical Survey*, Amsterdam and New York: Rodopi 2007.

acknowledging its contributions to "modernity" and thus figuring as a "model" for China, but on the other hand it is perceived as aggressive toward the rest of the world through its excessive colonialism, imperialism, and an exploitive capitalist system. It should be noted that the treatment in history classes through the first half of the 20th century rather restricts the discussion to politics and partly economy, while culture, for example, is barely touched upon, and religion, i.e. Christianity, is criticized as something opposed to "modernity". In terms of a historical approach, the "great men" view of the late imperial era is followed by a territorial preoccupation during Republican times, also visually expressed in the extensive use of maps. This bespeaks the increasingly nationalist political agenda of the Chinese government at the time, which also attempted to "prove" in the 1930s China's contribution to "world history", not only referring to important technical inventions, but even laying claims to the significant historical role of the "Chinese Mongols" and their one-time world empire. This way, the Chinese "self" was to reassert itself also internationally, at least for the eyes of the young generation at home, which was supposed to become more patriotic by studying the textbooks.

We then move into the post-WWII times with a more specific attention to the PRC and Taiwan and the respective views on Russia and the Soviet Union provided by official school history. In the PRC (Yang) the view on Russia was largely narrowed down to the history of the Soviet Union in terms of politics and economy, and the way this was, and is, treated also reveals much about the changing policies in the PRC at particular times. While the history of other countries was considered less important, the Soviet Union was perceived as the most "significant other" for the early PRC. Focusing on the portrayal of key topics like the October Revolution, Stalinism, WWII, but also the more "delicate" post-Stalin economic reforms of Khrushchev (1894–1971) treated only more recently in school history, the shifts in political agendas in mainland China as reflected in curricula and textbooks from the 1950s to today become evident. The international context with the deterioration of Sino-Soviet relations as well as the foreign policy easing of relations with "the West" since the 1970s also impacted directly on textbook contents. The dissolution of the Soviet Union, finally, challenged the Chinese reading of Soviet history to provide explanations to pupils of what to learn from the Soviet "errors" to avoid a similar outcome at home, and to prove that the Chinese government had taken the right measures to develop socialism in a more successful direction. However, the "reappearance" since the 1990s of sovereign states formerly integrated in the Soviet Union implicitly reopened the sensitive question as to the legitimacy of rule over areas culturally distinct.

In the case of Taiwan (Chang), the issue of legitimacy of rule is pertinent from the opposite side. Historically speaking, while the PRC textbooks, especially

during the 1950s, geared toward the Soviet Union, the ROC textbooks rather downplayed the topic of Russia, while Taiwan itself had hardly any "Russian connection". In fact, prior to the end of Japanese colonial rule in 1945, very few Russians ever appeared on the island, and after the GMD (Guomindang 國民黨, National People's Party) took over, it simply exported its anti-Soviet stance from the mainland to Taiwan, always connected to its antagonism with the CCP (Chinese Communist Party), its main concern. Politically, though, the U.S. were the "significant other" of postwar Taiwan, and Europe an above all cultural entity. While GMD textbooks continued to reveal the Republican era preoccupation with Tsarist Russia's "aggression" toward China and the territorial gains this had implied, the Soviet Union was portrayed as a new form of "imperialism", and the CCP as lackeys of the Soviets. Only beginning with the split between the PRC and the Soviet Union, the anti-Soviet element was toned down in Taiwan, and after the end of the Soviet Union, the changed international setting, the newly started Russo-Taiwanese relations, as well as the democratization in Taiwan which impacted on the education system, too, allowed for a more relaxed treatment of "Russian" history. By interviews with Taiwanese teachers of two generations on the topic of teaching Russian history in Taiwanese schools, the chapter also provides a rare glimpse into the inner working of schooling regarding a topic largely new to teachers as well as pupils. It also makes clear that from the perspective of the pupils the teaching of history has to be seen in relationship to other subjects like geography, where knowledge about "others" is transmitted, too. Furthermore, it shows that shifts in the historiographical approach, like the present focus on transnational global history, also lead to new forms in history education content and teaching methods, for example moving beyond chronology to more project-based topic-focused ones, especially on the senior secondary level. Notably, such approaches have also been tested in PRC history education in the 2000s.

On the basis of these two specialized studies on the PRC's and Taiwan's dealing with Russian/Soviet history, we take a comparative look between both systems' dealing with Russia and the West in curricula and textbooks, at first for the period of the Cold War (MÜNNING). While both systems used history education as a tool to inculcate their respective ideologies, the PRC shifted decidedly more during the time, given the ups and downs in ideological orientation, whereas Taiwan under GMD rule remained largely in the trail set in Republican times on the mainland. On a general level, while the concept of "class" was central to the PRC up to the 1980s, GMD-Taiwan accentuated the concept of "nation". In Taiwan, the evaluation of both Tsarist Russia and the Soviet Union was equally negative, whereas the PRC clearly differentiated between the "aggressive" Tsarist Russia and the "best times" of the Soviet Union, intending the times under LENIN (1870–1924)

and STALIN (1878/79–1953). Conversely, the image of "the West" was much more positive in Taiwan, if acknowledging also the dark sides of imperialism and colonialism, whereas the PRC found much less of a "model" in this context and only carefully introduced some positive elements during the post-Cultural Revolution reform period. By focusing on some historical topics through the ages discussed in textbooks on both sides of the Taiwan Strait, the chapter presents the different outlooks on "world history" during the Cold War times in Taiwan and the PRC as presented to the pupils, thus forming their respective worldview, and the shifts visible therein. In general, though, while the West was "appropriated" in Taiwan, it was "deconstructed" in the PRC; and while Russia was "demonized" in GMD-Taiwan, the Soviet Union was "idolized" in the (early) PRC. In this setting, it is the perception of Russia that has undergone the greatest shifts, due to the political changes both in Russia and in the PRC or Taiwan, while "the West" has remained more stable in representation.

The final chapter (RYSAKOVA) in this part again links both Taiwan and the PRC, now for the most recent times, looking into the representation of Western countries and Russia in history textbooks and curricula since the Cold War. It shows how the newer trend of writing global history is made to serve as a tool for national identity construction via teaching. While in Taiwan, due to democratization, the curricula are an issue broadly and hotly debated throughout society where different points of view can be voiced, in the PRC the careful pluralization of the 1990s has been recently withdrawn in the name of a strengthened "patriotism". Here, the opposition to "others" outside the borders, i.e. moving beyond the earlier inter-party (GMD vs. CCP) rivalry, serves as a catalyst to improve societal cohesion (and rules out the divisive "class struggle" rhetoric of former times). The chapter also argues that in Taiwan, "Western" scholarship is taken up in the writing of "global history" by using the latter's inherent anti-Eurocentrism, namely by authors caring about a more "Taiwanese" approach, for their own agenda. This often includes also a distancing from mainland China by paralleling the latter with "equally external" Europe, and thus puts "China" in the category of "world history" distinct from the local Taiwanese one. In the PRC, in turn, "world history" is now proactively used to claim the Chinese point of view as the new "master narrative" on a global scale in the name of an international "balancing out" of the "right to speak". This also shows that school history is not only closely linked to larger historical debates, but even more so to foreign policy concerns. Historians at times try to find a way out by redesigning issues. The category of "the West", for example, is at times rephrased as "developed countries" on both sides of the Taiwan Strait, by this making "development" and "modernity" into the key criteria without localizing them geographically per se, but following different agendas respectively

nevertheless. Furthermore, due to Taiwan's contested identity construction and its precarious international standing, the topic of "modernity" has the advantage of being less controversial than the ever-problematic "nation" concept. A topical arrangement, especially experimented with on the senior secondary level in both Taiwan and the PRC and often in non-compulsory courses, also gives more leeway to teachers in treating topics with pupils harboring a special interest in history. In that context, the concept of "the West" is also more flexible, covering different geographical areas (i.e. of different modern nation states), depending on the subject and particular historical problems discussed.

The second part of this volume deals with literary images, discussing how fictionalized representations defined, enlivened, or problematized Russia and the West for the Chinese reading public. Taking the question of radical evil and its personified form in Western/Russian literature as a starting point, chapter 6 (VETROV) discusses the Chinese grappling with this concept at first glance alien to Chinese readers, which connects Russia and "the West" via Christianity, and via literary intertextual relations. Namely, the famous German drama *Faust* by GOETHE (1749–1832) centrally concerned with the question of man and evil personified in the figure of Mephistopheles, reverberates also in Russian literature, while Russian authors also develop their own approach to evil and cross-refer between each other. Russian literature, on the one hand strongly linked to Western literature but on the other also very distinct, thus provides a multi-layered case which is of particular interest to China. The preoccupation with the topic of radical evil points to a common ground of "European" literature and thinking, but differences also appear in the way this is applied. A critical potential of the concept of radical evil is developed in Russian literature in various ways. On the one hand, it may serve for distancing Orthodox "holy" Russia from the "West", when outstanding 19th century Russian writers of impact in 20th century China like GOGOL (GOGOL′, 1809–1852) and (more controversially in Chinese 20th century eyes) DOSTOEVSKY (DOSTOEVSKIĬ, 1821–1881) depict (elements of) "the West" as an incarnation of evil: be it modernity with its technical "progress" and secularization, be it the Enlightenment with its rationality, or be it Catholicism and the Pope. Even socialism, still nascent in the 19th century, is hinted at as one of these dangerous embodiments by DOSTOEVSKY. But the figure of personified evil can also be turned into a device to criticize the (realized) socialist Soviet system in Russia herself by positively positioning oneself vis-à-vis the "Western" tradition (and GOETHE's *Faust*) as in the case of 20th century Russian "dissident" writer BULGAKOV (1891–1940), censured for many years in the Soviet Union and received in China only more recently. Interweaving "Western", Russian, and Chinese literature, literary theory, and literary studies along the lines of this topic of radical evil

and through various phases of the 20th century, the chapter traces the changing agendas in China as reflected in the discussions of personified evil in general, and in the context of several literary works, from GOETHE's *Faust*, over pertinent works of GOGOL and DOSTOEVSKY to BULGAKOV, in particular. The shifts in Chinese interpretation modes, while closely related to changing Chinese politics, are furthermore set in relation to Russian/Soviet scholarship which for years was seen as authoritative in the PRC. The discussion of foreign concepts in China often did not wait for longer translations becoming available, as can be typically seen earlier in the century with the ideologically charged times of the late 1910s and the 1920s. At the time, a presumably "Faustian spirit" was propagated to hail creativity and originality of man without need of any God above, while the "Satanic" developed a negative attractiveness as a destructive, but welcome, force to smash the old and obsolete as a necessary correlate. Evil, thus, appears foremost as a social issue, and the Devil as a justified rebel. But a closer look into the history of longer or full translations of the literary works of the named foreign authors into Chinese which centrally deal with personified evil, the main genre being novels, over the 20th century, also makes evident that translations (and choices of what to translate and when) are a subtle continuation of politics in many ways, too. While Chinese interpretative approaches significantly increased their psychological complexity over time, given the greater leeway to discuss "evil" beyond the social after the Cultural Revolution, the ethical-theological specific concern of *personified* evil remains largely marginalized or even neutralized, given the sensitive Christian dimension and the non-transcendental thrust of interpretation in China. However, some recent Chinese readings of the Russian "classics" venture into the religious background of the concept of evil more outspokenly, connecting it, notably though, with a self-assertive cultural identity position via-à-vis "the West", presumably mirrored in the Russian case.

The following chapter (CHEN) takes inspiration from FOUCAULT to zoom closer into the role of the consciousness of the dark and mad as a mode to deal with modern "Westernized" civilization by intertwining the Russian critical "response" to the latter of 19th century writer GOGOL with the famous Republican-era Chinese writer LU Xun 魯迅 (1881–1936), a dedicated reader (and translator) of GOGOL. In this context, the chapter attempts to go beyond the conventional paradigm of "influence" of GOGOL on LU Xun by asking what might have induced LU Xun to pick up on this particular Russian writer in many ways so different in ideological outlook. Beyond the obvious literary referencing of GOGOL by LU Xun, most famously with the figure of the "madman" who writes a diary to expose the society he lives in (if with a decidedly different thrust of argument in the case of LU Xun who ends his story with a return of the "madman" to "normality"), the

Ukrainian-Russian GOGOL and the Chinese LU Xun have more things in common. Notably, they both reflect in parallel parts of the respective "self's" "little tradition" (Robert REDFIELD), GOGOL, himself from "Little Russia", more precisely the Ukraine, by referring repeatedly in his early works to Ukrainian folk tales told in the evening, brimming with demons, goblins, and other weird creatures, and LU Xun by referring to China's "little tradition" of tales of the strange and miraculous in popular literature. They therewith open up the respective indigenous marginalized realms of a consciousness of the dark and mad in a centralized, supposedly rational, and illuminated "Westernized", but alienating modern world; positioned between fear and laughter, tragedy and comedy. However, LU Xun, a man of the 20th century and certainly no defender of the ancient régime, mirrors the rationality and modernity associated with "the West" doubly, precisely by integrating the Slavophile satirist GOGOL. In his prose, while attacking Chinese traditionalism, his own bête noire, with "carnivalesque" (BAKHTIN) means à la GOGOL, LU Xun thus puts the "Russian" lens in between China and "the West", resulting in the blurring of a neat "self and other" division.

The next chapter (RODIONOV) considers more specifically the fictional representations of Russia by focusing on a genre with its own peculiarities: literary periodicals in China, which presented a view on foreign countries, mostly "Western" ones, but also addressing Russia, for a broader reading public in Republican times. The presentation modes included creative works, translations, and accompanying illustrations. By analyzing the range of representations in such a serial format with relatively shorter texts, the chapter focuses on the yet understudied side of the Nationalists to counter the usual preoccupation with the views of Chinese leftist writers on Soviet Russia. In these nationalist periodicals of 1930–1931, at the very high time of GMD-CCP animosity after the bloody end of the First United Front in 1927, and subsequent to the 1929 military clashes with the Soviet Union over the Chinese Eastern Railway in Manchuria, it becomes obvious that the sensitive topic of Russia was of considerable concern to the GMD no less. While the periodicals were designed to advertise nationalism in a literary format by the GMD-affiliated writers to counter the proletarian literature movement driven by the leftists, the strong link between literature and nation-building as perceived by them, for example, in Western Europe, extended also to Russia. In fact, a split image of "Russians" evolved in these periodicals between the "dangerous Reds" and the (often poor and émigré) "Whites", seen on the streets of Shanghai, where the periodicals were published. Furthermore, the service of some "White" Russians in the GMD military also allowed for a personal contact of some of the GMD writers reflected in literary pieces, which moved the image of "Russians" beyond the exclusive "Soviet" definition. While the Soviets were predictably depicted very negatively in

the periodicals, partly based on personal experience by some GMD writers who had been held captive by the Soviets in the wake of the 1929 crisis, the "other Russians" were at times presented in a way to solicit sympathy from the Chinese readers for their difficult émigré status, longing to go back to "their" homeland. Furthermore, by reference to the Russian "peasant poets" who were supposed to stand for Russia's true "national spirit", an image of "another Russia" than the one embodied in the Communist Soviet Union was evoked, thus challenging the leftist monopoly on representations of "Russia" and suggesting that the Soviet Union was a deplorable aberration in the history of the Russian nation.

The final contribution in this part, chapter 9 (MONSCHEIN), presents a very different Chinese view on Soviet Russia in a later period. Here the focus is on recent mainland Chinese literature, mainly through the lens of the author WANG Meng 王蒙 (*1934) who embodies an intersection of the national and the private as a CCP member and former Minister of Culture of the PRC, but writing as an author about private memories as well. These bespeak his own strong emotional attachment to things Soviet and represent, to some degree, a generation growing up in the 1950s, developing a "romantic" relationship with the Soviet Union, and then having to live through the Sino-Soviet split and all that came thereafter as a kind of harsh, but sobering coming-of-age. By this, he stands for a generation mourning its lost ideals, but also reminding present-day PRC society of this part of its own history by now largely relegated to the "subconscious". Therefore, the chapter argues, his literary "memorial" to the Soviet Union, published fifteen years after the latter's end, is a very conscious choice and goes well beyond a simple nostalgia. WANG's writings furthermore demonstrate the decisive role of intangible Soviet-Russian heritage, not the least manifested in literature and film but also songs and music, which created and sustained this lasting emotional attachment of a whole generation of mainland Chinese, even if not necessarily knowledgeable in the Russian language. While film and literature were received in translation, music did not need any "translation" for speaking "to the heart". However, the music and songs WANG refers to in his semiautobiographical writings are of themselves interlaced with Western cultural modes as well (for example TCHAIKOVSKY's (CHAĬKOVSKIĬ) *Capriccio Italien*, integrating Italian street music motifs), and at the same time with traditional Russian (including "Little Russian") popular culture. This interwoven texture links "Russia", "the West", and China, literature and music, memory and desire, the political and the personal, the "self" and the "other(s)" in a free and playful way comparable to the literary-musical form of a *Capriccio* to commemorate the Soviet Union, and China's (and WANG's) own past at the same time. This "realm of memory", though, is by the author supposed to inform but not block any new turn life in China is going to take. But it claims, against

present-day Russian as well as Chinese official memory politics, the legacy of this particular past as something due to be addressed, not repressed. In this, WANG is supported by other Chinese writers who might differ in their evaluation of the Soviet Union and even might rather prefer a broader take on "Russia" such as writer and painter FENG Jicai 冯骥才 (*1942) with his pronounced interest in daily life and popular culture, be it in China or in Russia. FENG, however, had also learnt the language, in contrast to WANG, and accessed "Russia" in more varied ways. But in spite of their differences, there is a shared belief that the memory of the past needs to be preserved in all its complexity and with all the conflicting emotions this may raise, for better or for worse, in a present-day mainland Chinese society tending to (or being induced to) forget and ignore this particular history as part of the "self".

The third part in this volume, dealing with visual and material representations, starts with a look into a popular genre, the traditional Chinese *nianhua* 年畫 (New Year prints) of late imperial times which had a broad dissemination and formed images of foreigners and things foreign (mostly Western ones) for a broader public (STAROVOITOVA). Russian China scholars collected these popular woodblock prints systematically over years, resulting in a remarkable holding of this form of folk art in St. Petersburg today. The *nianhua* testify to a visual *imaginaire* for "the masses". They were at times ordered and distributed as a way to criticize or satirize foreigners, namely Christians, by local elites perceiving themselves endangered by foreign encroachment and competition. The visual representations on these anti-Christian *nianhua* could serve to encourage societal xenophobic outbursts resulting in physical attacks on foreign and Chinese Christians with at times fatal outcomes. The negative stereotyping of foreign missionaries, Christian beliefs, and claimed societal "scandalous" behavior diverging from Chinese traditional norms mixed mockery with puns and visual negative signs like the use of green color for depravity familiar to the broader public from theatre performances. The *nianhua* were, however, not all satirizing and criticizing foreigners, but also put to use in the opposite sense, i.e. to advertise "modern" trends and fashions by those positively interested in the "Western" lifestyle. Here, the topic of women and (modern) schooling played a significant part, popularizing new ideas on gender roles and education with this widespread and affordable genre. This shows that the popular *nianhua* genre was attractive to people with widely diverging views. At times, the *nianhua* just reflected the simple fact of foreign things having become part of Chinese life already (or at least attest to the perceived desirability of such things), be it Western-style clothing or bicycles, while other *nianhua* were used to project wishful thinking in theatre-like fashion vis-à-vis the foreign/foreigners in this visual medium for a broader public.

This "mass-oriented" approach is continued in chapter II (GULEVA) with the (Western) format of cartoons representing foreigners, here namely those of the "West" which sometimes included Russians, notably both Soviet and "White", in the mid-1930s. As this chapter demonstrates, the categories of "Russia" and "the West" very much depended on the viewpoint and were contingent on time circumstances. Thus, in the Chinese cartoon magazines of 1934–1937 considered in more detail, even Soviet Russia often appeared along with "Western" countries, since the main concern at the time was national power vs. weakness. In this context, the Soviet Union was as much a global player in power politics as Western countries. In cultural contexts, in turn, the concept of "European" was prevalent, again including the Russians. Here, the intersection with "race" is apparent, too, as the "Russians" were seen as part of the "white race", and "race" was a central concern in GMD China. On the other hand, political systems suggested different groupings at the time, given the totalitarian regimes in Italy, Germany and the Soviet Union, typically also identified with their single power-holders MUSSOLINI, HITLER, and STALIN personally, or with the emblems of their respective regimes, as opposed to other "Western" nations subscribing to democracy, and therefore also less prone to stabile personalization in representation. This often was substituted by a tagging with flags, for example. In the perspective of imperialism and/or capitalism, dividing lines were potentially different again. Thus, in the cartoon magazines, China was rather constructed as a "victim" alongside other global fellow victims of power politics and economic exploitation. These "fellow victims" included Ethiopia / Abyssinia which was attacked by fascist Italy at the time, with the League of Nations, perceived by the Chinese as de facto representing "the West", only standing by, just passing some resolutions. This reminded Chinese readers of the situation in Manchuria where the League's critical investigation into the Japanese invasion of 1931 (the "Manchurian incident") had equally not proved very helpful. The Spanish Republic, in turn, had entered into Civil War in 1936, presented in the Chinese cartoon magazines as torn between Fascists and Communists more foreign than domestic, foreboding intensifying foreign threat and interference also in China. While Ethiopia was praised for its at least initial try to fight back the Italians, different from the Indian GANDHI-model, i.e. opposing the British colonizers with nonviolent means only, which was mocked as naive by the Chinese cartoonists, the implicit suggestion was for China to take a tougher stand against foreign encroachment. The plight of the helpless Spanish people in between the belligerents, in turn, solicited sympathy, and simultaneously expressed Chinese fears of a similar fate. This way, the "others" were depicted with an implicit reference to the Chinese "self". On the other hand, real-life destitute foreigners, namely the émigré Russians on Shanghai's streets where the cartoon

magazines were published, were looked down upon as White "failed cases", contrasting badly with the "successful" Westerners far away, above all now intending the Americans, which in spite of all continued to serve as global trendsetters also for Chinese daily life. Still, the feeling that behind the attractive appearance of "the West", for China herself, nothing but doom was in store, was palpable in the cartoon magazines during this period immediately preceding the Second Sino-Japanese War.

Chapter 12 (SAMOYLOV) continues the thread of visual representations of Russia (i.e. now the Soviet Union) and "the West" in "mass-oriented" media (including the "new" *nianhua*-genre as well as cartoons or public posters) into the 1950s to early 1970s, and thus into the times of the Cold War. At this point, the PRC constructed the public imagery of "the West" clearly in confrontational terms, while the image of the "Soviets" shifted completely over this period. The primary dividing line of systemic alliances, i.e. the "capitalist" and the "socialist camp", clearly situated the Soviet Union and "the West", primarily represented now by the U.S., as opposed to each other. During the 1950s, the Soviet Union was *the* reference for China, captured in the image of the "elder brother" and "teacher", and this Sino-Soviet "honeymoon" period was reflected accordingly in the visual *imaginaire* via different publicly accessible formats to reach out to all kinds of target groups. However, the downturn of Sino-Soviet relations after STALIN reconfigured the imagery, with the Soviet Union growing from a friend into a competitor and finally a foe, though still different from the enemy "West". This is tangible in the visual representations. For example, the Chinese derogatory "paper tiger" image propagated by MAO Zedong 毛泽东 (1893–1976) to encourage the Chinese "self" against a seemingly potent "other", remained exclusive to the U.S. / "the West". The Soviet Union, though, was never addressed as a "paper tiger", but was characterized after the Sino-Soviet split and in the context of the Chinese Cultural Revolution as a hotbed of "revisionists" which still are in the "socialist camp", but have gone ideologically astray. What paralleled both "enemies" of the PRC at that point, however, was the Chinese fear of military confrontation. Before, it had been "only" the U.S. / "the West" engaged on the "other side" in the Korean War in the 1950s as well as in the Indochina War of the 1950s–1970s. But after the Sino-Soviet split, tensions were mounting also with the Soviet Union, in the end a direct neighbor of the PRC with a long common border. The Chinese uneasiness created by witnessing Soviet interference in other parts of the (socialist) world received a boost by the 1969 Sino-Soviet border clash as a first military confrontation with the former "elder brother" which was accordingly reflected in Chinese posters and cartoons. The latter were designed for a Chinese public to reassure them of the

PRC's military strength, while diplomacy discretely tried to save the situation by preparing for a new rapprochement with the U.S.

The following chapter (CHIANG) leads us to Taiwan and adds to the discussion of imagery and perception the important aspect of intangible vs. tangible heritage by looking into the "revival" of the Russian Orthodox Church in Taiwan. Starting from the physical fact of a small Russian Orthodox chapel found in Taipei today, the chapter sets out to trace the history of the Russian Orthodox Church in Taiwan, discovering the crucial importance of intangible heritage, since the history of that Church could hardly refer to something enduring and tangible. Most of the latter had disappeared over time between Japanese colonialism (1895–1945) and the subsequent shift to the National People's Party (GMD/KMT) rule, given the Cold War and the suspicion raised by anything Russian in anti-Communist Taiwan. Furthermore, the personal composition of the community was subject to continuous change as well between temporary joining Japanese before 1945, émigré Russians, and the few local Taiwanese Orthodox believers. The post-WWII situation connected the few émigré Russians in Taiwan, sometimes wives of U.S.-aviators of the "Flying Tigers" volunteer unit helping the Chinese against the Japanese in WWII, with "the West" in political terms, while their Orthodox faith made them distinct. Still, with Japan, the former point of reference for the Orthodox faithful in Taiwan due to the colonial condition, as well as Taiwan now being under the wings of the U.S. during Cold War times, ecclesiastic relations with the Moscow Patriarchate which tried to claim control, were at first a problem. Taiwan thus linked up with the rivalling Russian Orthodox Church Outside Russia (ROCOR). After the end of martial law in Taiwan in 1987 and the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991, things Russian became easier to "revive". "Naming" was one of the ways this could be done to create a "realm of memory", while inner-ecclesiastic tensions between the rivalling Patriarchate of Moscow and the Ecumenical Patriarchate of Constantinople interfered "from above" with the tradition-building practices of the faithful "from below". To anchor their legacy also in a tangible way, the faithful thus (re)created their Russian Orthodox Church with a chapel in Taipei.

Chapter 14 (LI) takes us back to the PRC and to the focus on the tangible, looking at Harbin, the most Russian city in China, and how the normal people dealt, and deal, with "European", mostly de facto Russian, architecture so strongly represented and inherited in their city, and the conflicting emotions these buildings at times raised. While the Soviet-Russian architecture de facto often took inspiration from Western Europe, the distinct Soviet style was seen as a model for socialist buildings in the PRC, also beyond Harbin. But in Harbin which as a city was created by the Russians, Russian architecture is a defining feature and thus closely connected to local identity issues. During PRC times, the admiration for the Soviet

style stood in contrast to the ideological antagonism to "imperialism" and "colonialism" represented by older European-style buildings. The main thrust of Cultural Revolution destruction thus was directed against a "Russianness" represented by, above all, churches, while the Soviet-style buildings were rather perceived as standing for "socialism" and thus spared. In commercialized post-Cultural Revolution China, though, the exotic flair of the Russian/European architecture is a selling point in city branding, appearing also on posters and other visual formats. In the bid to attract tourists, even reconstructions of "lost" (i.e. previously consciously destroyed) heritage in theme parks are seen as viable means, while in literature, art, and daily life, the Russian architectural heritage functions as a tangible site for (nostalgic) remembrance. Not the least the Russian churches with onion domes or in a Byzantine style are iconized as an unquestionable symbol of Russianness which mark the latter as distinct from a general "Westernness". Similar moves to preserve or reconstruct outstanding foreign buildings as in Shandong, for example, with German colonial architecture, underline the fact that the Chinese "self" has been tied to the tangible heritage of "others" in the context of a local identity definition also with regard to the "West" at other places in China, too.

Chapter 15 (MÜLLER) tackles the ambivalence of tangible heritage of foreigners in China from the peculiar angle of Western and Russian tombs and cemeteries still extant in Greater China, posing the question as to whose "heritage" this actually is. While foreign architecture may be reused, altered or erased, tombs are more problematic since they involve human remains beyond the tombstones and cannot be used in any other way, nor can they be altered. They can be erased, though. Any decision of keeping them or not is sensitive on personal, religious, and political-diplomatic levels, and if they are kept, they need to be looked after. Thus, the question arises as to whose heritage this is, as tombs are first of all private, but may also be nationalized, for example in the case of "Soviet martyrs" or the military in general. They also challenge the view of the Chinese "self" by reminding the present society of the lingering impact of the foreign "others", regardless whether these recall a happy or an unhappy "common" history, and pose the question as to how the present societies in Greater China want to deal with this legacy: accept it, relativize it, or repress it. With a look to the different "Chinese" settings in Macau, Hong Kong, Taiwan, and mainland China, and the focus on Western and Russian tombs and their tangible and visual presence, which mark their "otherness" and peculiarity to the surrounding societies, this chapter concludes this volume on Chinese perceptions of Russia and the West during the 20th century.

The final remarks (SAMOYLOV) elaborate on some more general implications of the whole book, arguing for the need to expand the still nascent field of imagological studies to connect with wider trends in scholarship. Beyond

scholarship, though, the social relevance of perceptions and images of "the other/s" needs to be accounted for, not the least for addressing possible conflicts engendered by them. In short, there is also a societal necessity to recognize not only the importance of facts, but also the impact of perceptions and images on human behavior, to further attempts at peace-keeping in a complex world.